


















State dependence, duration dependence and unobserved 
heterogeneity in the employment transitions of the over-50s 
 
 
Lorenzo Cappellari  Richard Dorsett  Getinet Haile 
 














UNIVERSITA’ CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE 




QUADERNI DELL’ISTITUTO DI 








State dependence, duration dependence and unobserved 
heterogeneity in the employment transitions of the over-50s 
 
 
Lorenzo Cappellari  Richard Dorsett  Getinet Haile 
 














































QUADERNI DELL’ISTITUTO DI 
ECONOMIA DELL’IMPRESA E DEL LAVORO 
 
Istituto di Economia dell’Impresa e del Lavoro 
Facoltà di Economia 
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore 
Largo Gemelli, 1 - 20123 Milano 
 
* I quaderni sono disponibili on-line all’indirizzo dell’Istituto 
http://www.unicatt.it/istituti/ EconomiaImpresaLavoro 
 
* Esemplare fuori commercio per il deposito legale agli effetti della 
Legge n. 106 del 15 aprile 2004. 
 
* La Redazione ottempera agli obblighi previsti dalla Legge n. 106 
del 15.04.2006, Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica del 
03.05.2006 n. 252 pubblicato nella G.U. del 18.08.2006 n. 191. 
 State dependence, duration dependence and unobserved 


















This paper examines employment transitions among men and women in the UK aged 
between 50 and the state pension age.  We begin by examining the issue of duration 
dependence, using standard duration models.  We then use a fourth order Markov 
model to estimate quarterly transitions while allowing for potential endogeneity of 
initial conditions.  The results reject exogeneity of initial conditions and show the 
importance of both duration dependence and state dependence.  This implies there is 
the potential for any individual to become trapped in non-employment and, ideally, 
policy should intervene as soon as an individual begins a period of non-employment. 
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I. Introduction 
In common with many developed countries, the population of the UK is ageing.  By 
2020, it is expected that a third of the population will be over the age of 50 (Dean, 
2003).    The  increased  pressure  that  an  older  population  places  on  the  workforce 
means that there is growing policy interest in encouraging older individuals to remain 
in paid employment.  This was most recently acknowledged in the UK government’s 
consultation  document  (DWP,  2006)  which  announced  the  policy  objective  of 
increasing by one million the number of older workers – that is, those aged 50 or over 
– in employment. Similar concerns are shared across OECD countries (OECD 2006). 
Such an ambitious target highlights the need to understand the nature of the 
employment decision for older individuals.  This is subject to a number of rather 
specific influences that distinguish it from the employment decision for prime-age 
workers.  Most obviously, older workers may face the decision of whether to retire.  
They are also more likely to be influenced by health considerations.  Meghir and 
Whitehouse (1997) and Blundell et al. (2002) both showed the important influence of 
economic incentives on retirement decisions in the UK.  More recently, Haardt (2006) 
used longitudinal data in Britain to show that earnings capacity has little effect on the 
decision to retire but benefit level is a strong predictor. Haardt (2006) also found that 
(self-reported)  health  is  correlated  with  employment  decisions  and  Disney  et  al. 
(2006) showed that the importance of health to employment decisions remains after 
allowing for the possibility that self-reported health may be endogenous. 
The  analysis  in  this  paper  focuses  on  a  different  aspect  of  the  employment 
transitions of older workers.  We explore the extent to which the probability of being 
employed at a point in time depends on employment status at an earlier point in time 
and  also  whether  the  length  of  time  spent  in  that  earlier  employment  state  is 
important.  That is, we focus explicitly on the related issues of state dependence and   5 
duration dependence.  We do this by using data from the UK Longitudinal Labour 
Force  Survey  and  pursuing  two  alternative  and  interrelated  modelling  approaches: 
survival  analysis  and  (high  order)  Markovian  models  of  transitions  across  labour 
market states. The first approach makes use of the retrospective information on spell 
duration  available  in  the  data  to  model  the  probability  of  spell  exhaustion  as  a 
function of spell duration, providing estimates of duration dependence. The second 
approach models transitions by following individuals across labour market states over 
the five quarters for which they are observed in the data, enabling an assessment of 
state dependence and its accumulation over quarters. 
The  importance  of  these  issues  to  understanding  the  underlying  processes 
governing  the  observed  persistence  in  labour  market  states  is  clear.    Under  state 
dependence, or ‘scarring’, previous labour market status has a causal effect on later 
labour market status.  For example, it may be that the experience of non-employment 
may by itself reduce the probability of later working (or searching for work).  It is 
equally possible that state dependence can operate in a virtuous manner; having been 
employed  in  the  past  may  increase  the  chances  of  being  employed  later.    Under 
duration dependence, it is the length of time in a particular state that influences the 
probability of changing state.  For example, it may be the case that a short period of 
non-employment has no adverse consequences on being employed subsequently but a 
prolonged  period  of  non-employment  has  a  negative  impact.    Again,  it  is 
straightforward  to  think  of  a  more  positive  counter-example  whereby  duration 
dependence acts to increase attachment to the labour market.  Arulampalam et al. 
(2000) provide a brief discussion of the possible causes of state dependence.  It may 
be that the experience of a state alters preferences or constraints in such a way that 
later employment is affected.  Another possibility is that employers use periods of 
non-employment  as  a  signal  of  low  productivity.    Alternatively,  human  capital   6 
deterioration during non-employment may reduce the probability of finding work. To 
the extent that these factors reinforce their effectiveness with unemployment spell 
duration, we may see them also as determinants of duration dependence. 
The existence of state dependence or duration dependence fundamentally alters 
interpretation of the determinants of employment.  Most obviously, it requires that 
labour market status be viewed, at least partly, as the outcome of a dynamic rather 
than  static  process.    Appropriate  policy  interventions  to  encourage  labour  market 
participation have to be developed accordingly.  In the presence of state dependence, 
interventions  should  aim  to  prevent  the  occurrence  of  an  adverse  state.    In  the 
presence  of  duration  dependence,  it  would  be  important  to  focus  help  as  soon  as 
possible on those entering an adverse state. 
The econometric challenge in examining these dynamic issues is to control for 
the effect of unobserved heterogeneity.  If an individual has a fixed (or long-term) 
characteristic that influences the probability of employment, not controlling for that 
characteristic  will  result  in  biased  estimates  of  state  or  duration  dependence.    A 
related  issue  is  the  so-called  ‘initial  conditions  problem’  which  arises  when  the 
starting point of the process governing outcomes is not observed.  In this case, it is not 
possible  to  observe  whether  the  employment  status  of  the  individual  when  first 
observed  (the  initial  condition)  is  the  result  of  state  dependence  or  unobserved 
heterogeneity.    The  models  developed  in  this  paper  control  for  unobserved 
heterogeneity and the initial conditions issue.   
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  In the next section, the data 
are described.  Section 3 describes the two modelling approaches, the results of which 
are presented in section 4.  Section 5 offers some conclusions.  
 
II. The data   7 
The analysis in this paper is based on the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS).  The LFS 
is  a  quarterly  survey  of  60,000  households  in  the  UK  with  a  focus  on  those 
characteristics related to the labour market.  It is carried out as a rotating panel with 
one-fifth  of  the  respondents  being  replaced  each  quarter.    Hence,  each  (fully-
participating) household is interviewed five times over a period spanning 12 months.  
All adult household members at a given address are interviewed.  The Longitudinal 
LFS (LLFS) links the quarterly surveys in the LFS so that it becomes possible to 
observe changes over time for households, families and individuals.  The data used in 
this  analysis  include  only  those  households  who  respond  to  interviews  in  all  five 
quarters – a balanced panel.
1   
To maximise the estimation sample size, the dataset has been built by combining 
as many LLFSs as possible such that there is no overlap in the periods of time covered 
by any of the LLFSs.
2  The final dataset used LLFSs from Summer 1993 – Summer 
1994 up until Summer 2003-Summer 2004.  To identify the required sample, only 
those individuals aged 50 or over but under state pension age were chosen.  In the 
UK, the state pension age is currently 65 for men and 60 for women so this means that 
the sample is composed of men who were aged 50-64 when first observed and women 
who were aged 50-59 when first observed.  The number of observations available for 
analysis in the resulting dataset was 25,664. 
Figure 1 below uses these data to show the change in the employment rate over 
the period 1993-2003 for men and women aged 50 or over but less than the state 
pension  age.    It  is  clear  that  over  the  period  there  has  been  an  increase  in  the 
employment rate for both men and women.  The increase for women is especially 
noticeable.     
                                                 
1 The sample is provided with weights that address the issue of non-response and attrition in the data; 




Table 1 describes the economic status of individuals when first interviewed.  To 
concentrate on the main groups, only those accounting for at least a half of one per 
cent of cases are included in the Table.  It can be seen that about half the men and 
slightly more of the women were employed when first interviewed.  Self-employment 
is much more common among men than women with the result that overall about two-
thirds of men and slightly fewer women can be viewed as working.  Unemployment is 
low in this population.  More significant is economic inactivity; this accounts for 
about 28 per cent of men and 35 per cent of women.




Inactive people who would like to work are less common than those who would 
not like to work.  For the former, the reason for inactivity is health-related in 69 per 
cent  of  all  cases  for  men  and  about  half  of  all  cases  for  women.    For  inactive 
individuals who do not want to work, health problems are cited as the reason by 51 
per cent of men and 34 per cent of women.  However, whereas women often state that 
they do not want to work since they are looking after the family or the home (this 
accounts for 35 per cent of inactive women who do not want to work), very few men 
give this reason.  Another important group is made up of those who are retired.  Of the 
                                                                                                                                            
2  Overlaps  were  avoided  in  order  to  prevent  double-counting  of  individuals  and  complicating  the 
survey weights. 
3 Note that the figures in the text do not exactly match those in the Table 1.  The reason for this is that 
the table only presents those categories accounting for at least a half of one per cent of all cases.  The 
sum of these excluded categories fully accounts for the differences between the figures quoted and 
those apparent from the Table.   9 
sample as a whole, 8 per cent of men and 4 per cent of women are retired.  Clearly, 
these are people who have retired before the state pension age. 
Of those not working but who have worked in the 8 years prior to interview, the 
experience of employment is often distant.  Table 2 shows that for nearly half the men 
and more than 60 per cent of the women their last experience of employment was 




In view of this, it is not surprising that transitions between employment and non- 
employment are relatively infrequent.  Table 3 compares the labour market state at the 
start of the survey year with that at the end of the survey year.  About 9 per cent of 
employed men and 10 per cent of employed women were not employed one year later.  
In the other direction, about 6-7 per cent of non-employed men and women were 





Further description of the data is given in Table 4, which reports mean values of 
the  characteristics,  including  spell  duration,  used  in  the  estimation.  The  duration 
information is based on retrospective information on when respondents entered the 
state  they  were  in  at  the  time  of  the  first  interview.  We  report  the  mean  values 
separately  for  men  and  women  according  to  their  employment  status  when  first 
observed.  
   10 
<TABLE 4> 
 
III. The econometric models 
In this section, the econometric models used for the analysis are presented. We 
begin with a standard duration model.  The purpose of this is to provide an initial 
insight  into  the  nature  of  duration  dependence  in  transitions  out  of  (or  into) 
employment, together with an appreciation of the extent to which these transitions are 
influenced  by  observed  characteristics,  having  controlled  for  unobserved 
heterogeneity.  Next,  we  move  to  a  high-order  Markov  model  for  transition 
probabilities over the five quarters spanned by the LLFS, which will allow us to look 
at the issue of state dependence and its accumulation over quarters, while accounting 
for the endogeneity of initial conditions. 
 
3.1 A model of time to exit employment or non-employment  
Given the characteristics of the data, and specifically the fact that we do not 
have information on multiple spells, we assess duration dependence by modelling the 
time it takes older workers to exit employment or non-employment using a discrete 
time
4 mixed proportional hazards (MPH) model in a single-spell framework (see van 
den Berg, 2001). This implies that we identify unobserved heterogeneity within single 
spells, not across spells. We do not consider endogenous selection into the initial 
labour  market  state  at  this  stage,  but  will  tackle  the  issue  using  an  alternative 
modeling approach.
5 Given this set-up, the hazard for individual i of exiting in period 
j can be written 
 
                                                 
4 Discrete rather than continuous time is a natural choice since the duration variables are measured to 
the nearest quarter. 
5 See Meghir and Whitehouse (1997) for a model with multiple spells and endogenous starting state.   11 
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where D(j) characterises the baseline hazard, vi is the unobserved heterogeneity term 
such that  ) log( i i v u ≡  and xi is a vector of covariates for individual i. Essentially, this 
is a model of transitions in which the identity of the departure and arrival labour 
market states plays no role, while the time it takes to exit from the departure state 
matters  (Lancaster,  1990).  This  complementary  log-log  specification  results  in  the 
discrete time version of the proportional hazards model.  We follow the example of 
numerous empirical analyses and assume that vi is Gamma-distributed with unit mean 
and finite variance.  This has the advantage of providing a closed form solution for the 
likelihood function (Lancaster 1990). We mitigate against possible bias arising from 
the assumption of a Gamma mixing distribution by specifying the baseline hazard 
flexibly.  Han and Hausman (1990) and Seuyoshi (1992) show that this approach can 
reduce the bias resulting from unobserved heterogeneity.
6    
In writing the likelihood function, it is important to take account of the structure 
of the data.  As described in section 2, individuals in the dataset were observed five 
times over the course of a year, with each of the observations separated by about 3 
months.  This means that most individuals are not observed at the start of their spell 
but instead have already been in their initial state (employment or nonemployment) 
for some time when first observed.  In other words, the spell data are left-truncated 
(‘delayed entry’) and the likelihood function has to condition on survival in the initial 
state up to the time of  first entering the dataset.  Using standard results (see, for 
example, Jenkins 2005), the log-likelihood function for individual i can be written 
                                                 
6 An alternative to specifying a distribution for the unobserved heterogeneity term is to approximate the 
distribution using a number of mass-points (Heckman and Singer, 1984).  Attempts to estimate models 
of this kind encountered convergence problems.     12 
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where yik is a binary indicator variable such that yik=1 if the spell for individual i ends 
in a transition in period k and yik=0 otherwise and di is the duration of the spell at the 
time  of  entering  the  dataset.    Since  di  varies  across  individuals,  each  individual’s 
contribution to the overall log-likelihood function is estimated for only a portion of 
that individual’s spell.  Taking all individuals in the dataset together allows us to 
characterise the hazard function for the full range of observed durations. 
 
3.2 A fourth-order Markov model of quarterly transition probabilities 
As  discussed  in  the  Introduction,  an  alternative  way  to  study  employment 
dynamics is to look at state dependence by means of Markovian models of labour 
market transitions. In these models, transitions are identified by following individuals’ 
movements over time across a given set of labour market states, assuming that the 
probability of occupying a certain state at a given point in time depends upon the 
experience  of  states  in  the  past.    A  popular  example  in  this  class  is  provided  by 
dynamic random effects models (see, for example, Arulampalam et al., 2000). Unlike 
MPH models, models in this class do not consider the impact of duration on transition 
probabilities,  but  explicitly  model  the  identities  of  the  states  crossed  during  the 
transition (Lancaster, 1990). 
 Many models for labour market transitions used by previous research, such as 
dynamic  random  effect  probits,  have  focussed  on  first  order  dynamics,  i.e.  have 
assumed that the process of interest can be adequately described by looking only at 
the dependence between labour market states at two adjacent points in time. In this 
paper we depart from these models and explicitly consider fourth order dynamics. 
There are three reasons for doing so. First of all, higher order models nest lower order   13 
ones, so that estimating fourth order dynamics will enable us to test the first order 
assumption made by previous studies. Second, given that we use quarterly data, by 
estimating fourth order dynamics we are able to relate individual labour market states 
in a given quarter to states observed as far back as the same quarter of the previous 
year, so that we are able to fully model within-year dynamics. Finally, the fourth order 
approach enables us to derive measures of cumulated state dependence, generating an 
intermediate measure of dependence between random effect probits (that look at state 
dependence) and survival analysis (that studies duration dependence).  
Models  of  labour  market  dynamics  face  an  initial  conditions  issue,  which 
emerges when the process of interest is serially correlated and its starting values are 
not available in the data. Due to serial correlation, the unobserved initial condition 
will be embedded in current and lagged levels of the process investigated. Given that 
modelling transitions requires conditioning current labour market states upon the past, 
the  unobserved  initial  condition  generates  the  endogeneity  issue  discussed  in 
Heckman (1981). Heckman proposed solving the issue by estimating the model of 
interest jointly with the distribution of the initial sample observation, and to model the 
latter  as  a  function  of  pre-sample  information  and  of  the  individual-specific  error 
component. Recently, Wooldridge (2005) has proposed an alternative solution, in the 
context of first order models, in which it is the individual-specific error component to 
be modelled conditional on the first observation. While computationally attractive, the 
Wooldridge approach assumes that dynamics are first order. Therefore, we control for 
initial  conditions  by  applying  the  Heckman  approach  to  the  case  of  fourth  order 
dynamics. 
Let e*it be the attachment to employment for individual i in quarter t, which 
depends upon the interaction between labour demand and supply, plus a series of 
control factors. While e*it is unobservable, in the data we have information on eit, a   14 
dichotomous employment indicator. As customary in this set-up, we assume that the 
employment event occurs when the latent propensity is large enough, and we fix the 
thresholds for employability at 0 without losing generality: eit=I(e*it>0), where I(.) is 
an indicator function. Since we are interested in within-year transitions, we specify a 
model for employment transitions conditional on exogenous regressors xit (that proxy 
for  the  potential  and  reservation  wage,  plus  all  other  relevant  shifters)  and  on 
indicators of labour market states occupied in the four preceding quarters: 
 
e*it = β’xit + λ1eit-1 + λ2eit-2 + λ3eit-3 + λ4eit-4 +εit      
 
The error term εit represents the convolution of all unobservable heterogeneity 
(either individual-specific or purely volatile) that may influence employment, and is 
assumed to be independent from xit. The problem of initial conditions emerges if εit is 
not independent of the indicators of past labour market states. Since such indicators 
may themselves be a function of individual specific attributes, independence of εit will 
in  general  be  violated,  inducing  an  endogeneity  issue.  The  solution  proposed  by 
Heckman  (in  the  case  of  first  order  models)  consists  of  estimating  the  transition 
equation and the process determining lagged states jointly. Here we extend it to fourth 
order dynamics. We assume that past states are determined according to the following 
rule: 
 
e*it-s= γs’zit-s + uit-s  s=1,2,3,4   
eit-s = I(e*it-s > 0)  
 
and control for the initial conditions issue by letting the unobserved component of 
these  equations  freely  correlate  with  unobserved  heterogeneity  in  the  transition   15 
equation with correlation coefficient  ρs.  In addition, we also allow for  free  cross-
process correlations in the equations for lagged states, with correlation coefficients 
σhk, k<h=3,4,5. 
By making distributional assumptions about the unobserved components of the 
model, the sample likelihood can be derived and the parameter of interest estimated. 
Specifically, we assume that the vector of errors (εit uit-1 uit-2 uit-3 uit-4) follows a five-
variate normal distribution with zero mean and covariance matrix Ω. The matrix Ω 
has extra-diagonal elements given by the correlation coefficients defined above, and, 
given the dichotomous nature of the observed dependent variables, diagonal elements 
equal to unity. The cross-error correlations control for unobserved heterogeneity in 
the process governing employment transitions.
7 
As discussed in, for example, Arulampalam et al. (2000), lagged labour market 
states should be modelled as functions of pre-sample information and information on 
variables predating labour market entry, such as parental backgrounds. Unfortunately, 
the LFS does not contain information of the latter type. Therefore we use xit-s to form 
each of the zit-s vectors. This implies that we are assuming strict exogeneity of the 
regressors in the transition equation. We also exploit knowledge of the year in which 
the individual entered the state in which s/he is observed at the first interview date, 
and complete the zit-s vectors with the national GDP growth rate measured in that year, 
with the idea that initial labour market states, but not transitions, depend upon the 
macroeconomic conditions prevailing at the time. 
8 
Estimation of transition probabilities enables assessment of the issue of state 
dependence,  i.e.  of  the  variation  in  the  probability  of  employment  induced  by 
                                                 
7 The likelihood function involves fifth order normal integrals, which are computed by simulation, 
using a GHK simulator with 100 random draws. 
8  Meghir  and  Whitehouse  (1997)  use  unemployment  rates  at  the  time  a  spell  is  first  observed  to 
instrument initial conditions. While they use contemporaneous unemployment rates in the transition   16 
differences in employment histories, holding individual heterogeneity constant. To the 
extent  that  unobserved  heterogeneity  has  been  appropriately  controlled  for,  state 
dependence  provides  estimates  of  the  causal  impact  of  past  history  on  current 
outcomes. The measures of state dependence typically derived from dynamic limited 
dependent  variable  models  is  the  ‘marginal  effect’  associated  with  the  lagged 
dependent variable of interest. Given the fourth order set up of this model, we present 
four such measures, each given by the marginal effect associated with each indicator 
of lagged states. In general, these measures will take the following form: 
 
SDj = Φ(b’x+lj)-Φ(b’x), j = 1,2,3,4 
 
where x contains continuous explanatory variables evaluated at their sample mean, 
and  dummy  variables  set  at  zero,  b  and  l  are  the  estimates  of  β  and  λ,  while Φ 
represents the standard normal cumulative density function. 
If  the  true  model  were  first  order,  additional  quarters  spent  in  employment 
should  not  affect  current  employment  probabilities.  This  provides  the  basis  for 
formulating a test for the null hypothesis that the correct order of the Markov chain is 
the first, i.e. H0: λ4= λ3= λ2=0. More generally, one can also test for higher order 
autoregression, namely the second (H0: λ4= λ3= 0) and the third (H0: λ4= 0).   
Observing  dependency  with  different  points  in  the  past  also  enables  us  to 
quantify  the  accumulation  of  state  dependence  as  the  time  spent  in  a  spell  of 
employment  increases  from  zero  to  four  quarters,  providing  an  intermediate 
dependence concept between state and duration dependence.  We define cumulated 
state dependence as 
 
                                                                                                                                            
equation, we flexibly control for aggregate economic conditions in the transition equation by means of   17 
CSD2 = Φ (b’x +l1 +l2)- Φ (b’x) 
CSD3 = Φ (b’x +l1 + l2+ l3)- Φ (b’x) 
CSD4 = Φ (b’x +l1 + l2+ l3+ l4)- Φ (b’x) 
 
i.e.  as  the  marginal  effects  on  current  participation  associated  with  having  been 
participating for two, three or four consecutive quarters, relative to non participation 
in the past (note: CSD1=SD1). 
 
IV. Results 
In this section, we begin by presenting the results obtained from the MPH 
model outlined above.  This is with a view to providing an insight into the degree of 
duration  dependence  characterising  the  data.    Following  this,  the  results  obtained 
controlling for the endogeneity of initial conditions are presented. 
 
4.1 MPH results 
Table 5 presents the coefficient estimates resulting from the MPH models of 
time to employment entry (for those who were not employed when first observed) and 
time to employment exit (for those who were employed when first observed).  The 




The  first  set  of  estimated  coefficients  represents  the  baseline  hazard.    In  all 
cases,  there  is  evidence  of  negative  duration  dependence.    That  is,  the  longer  an 
individual remains in the initial state, the smaller the hazard of exiting from the state 
                                                                                                                                            
year and quarter dummies.   18 
becomes.  This is true for both employment entry and employment exit.  It is also true 
for both men and women. The estimated baseline hazards over the first 10 years (40 
quarters) of a spell for men and women are shown graphically in Figure 2.




This  highlights  a  number  of  features.    First,  as  already  noted,  all  spells  are 
characterised by negative duration dependence; the hazards are highest towards the 
beginning of a spell and mostly decline monotonically thereafter.  Second, the degree 
of duration dependence is much more marked when considering employment entry 
than  when  considering  employment  exit.    The  results  suggest  that  the  hazard  of 
finding work soon after starting a non-employment spell is higher than the hazard of 
leaving employment soon after starting an employment spell.  Over time, the hazards 
of  employment  entry  and  exit  converge  to  some  extent,  particularly  for  women.  
Third, duration dependence appears slightly more marked for men than for women, 
especially when considering exits from employment.   
The results in Table 5 show personal characteristics to also be important.  Older 
men have a smaller hazard of employment entry and a larger hazard of employment 
exit than their younger counterparts.  This is particularly the case shortly before state 
pension  age,  reflecting  the  retirement  decision.    The  role  of  qualifications  is  less 
straightforward to interpret.  Level of qualification appears unimportant for women’s 
hazards and also for men’s employment exit hazard.  This is possibly reflecting the 
fact  that  qualifications  are  less  important  than  experience  among  older  workers.  
However,  the  employment  entry  hazard  is  higher  for  men  with  mid  level 
qualifications than it is for those with no qualifications.  Individuals still paying off 
                                                 
9 These hazard rates are calculated for an individual having observed characteristics represented by the 
base categories in Table 5. They are not conditional on unobserved heterogeneity. That is, they are 
averaged over the unobserved heterogeneity distribution.    19 
the mortgage for their accommodation have a higher hazard of employment entry and 
a lower hazard of employment exit than individuals who own their property outright.  
This is true for both men and women, perhaps signalling the need to have a job in 
order to keep up with mortgage repayments.  With regard to household composition, 
the presence of dependent children in the household has no effect on the hazards for 
men but increases the hazard of employment entry for women (but not the hazard of 
employment  exit  for  women).    This  may  be  explained  by  the  possibility  that  the 
children of women in this age group are likely to have reached – or be reaching – an 
age at which their mothers are able to consider re-entering the workforce following a 
period of time devoted primarily to childcare.  Having a partner does not affect the 
employment  entry  hazard  for  men  or  women  but  does  reduce  the  hazard  of 
employment exit for men (but not for women).  This may be capturing the increased 
need to work for those men partnered with non-earning women.  It is difficult to 
discern much pattern in the effects of occupation or industry on employment entry and 
exit  hazards  but  when  considering  regional  variation  there  is  some  evidence  of 
employment entry hazard being lower and employment exit hazards being higher in 
the northern regions of the country and, for women, also in London.  Finally, there is 
little evidence of consistent (i.e. across men and women) seasonality in the hazards of 
employment entry or exit for men or women.  There is no trend over time in the 
hazards of employment entry or exit.   
At  the  bottom  of  Table  5,  the  estimated  unobserved  heterogeneity  term  is 
presented.    This  is  significant  at  the  5  per  cent  level  in  all  the  hazards  with  the 
exception of the hazard of employment entry for men.  The employment exit hazards 
are  characterised  by  greater  (and  more  significant)  unobserved  heterogeneity  than 
employment entry hazards.  For both types of transitions, unobserved heterogeneity 
appears more important for women than for men.  This perhaps reflects the possibility   20 
that  the  participation  decision  is  relatively  straightforward  for  men  while  that  of 
women may more often have to take into account other commitments such as child-
raising and caring responsibilities.  In any event, the test statistics presented in Table 5 
point to the importance of accounting for unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
4.2 Markov model results  
The fourth order Markov model laid out in Section 3 has been estimated on the 
longitudinal component of the LFS for the years 1993-2004, separately for women 




Table 6 reports the estimated covariance structure of unobservables for men and 
women.  Estimated  coefficients  in  the  first  four lines  refer  to  correlations  between 
unobservables  in  the  transition  and  initial  condition  equations.  For  both  men  and 
women,  these  coefficients  are  statistically  significant  at  usual  confidence  levels, 
implying  that  initial  conditions  exogeneity  can  be  rejected.  The  formal  test  of 
exogeneity  reported  at  the  bottom  of  the  Table  emphatically  confirms  this.  The 
positive sign of the coefficients means that the unobserved factors that are associated 
with being in employment at a point in time also play a role in keeping individuals 
employed over time. One example of such factors could be unobserved labour market 
attachment. For women, unobserved heterogeneity appears to be more relevant than it 
is for men, since all the relevant correlations are larger. This evidence is consistent 
with the MPH results and could be given an analogous interpretation.  
The other estimated coefficients in the Table refer to ‘reduced form’ correlations 
across initial condition equations. These are larger than the estimates in the top part of   21 
the table, since they are unconditional on lagged indicators of labour market states. 
They appear similar for men and women. Overall, the estimated correlation structure 
indicates  that  there  is  some  heterogeneity  that  is  not  captured  by  the  regressors 







Table 7 reports the estimates of the measures of state dependence defined in the 
previous section, together with tests for the order of the Markov model. For men, it 
appears that dynamics are of an order higher than one, since the estimated maximum 
simulated likelihood coefficients on lagged employment indicators (see Table 8) are 
all statistically significant at conventional level of confidence, with the exception  of 
the  third  order  lag.  This  finding  is  reflected  in  the  estimated  measures  of  state 
dependence and cumulated state dependence. While the marginal effect associated 
with  the  employment  indicator  lagged  one  quarter  is  sizeable  (75  per  cent)  and 
significant, the other marginal effects on employment dummies lagged two and four 
quarters significantly shift the probability of current employment, by approximately 6 
percent each. As a consequence, there is an accumulation of state dependence over 
quarters within a year, a pattern that would not be captured by a first order model. 
Formal tests for the order of the Markov chain cannot reject the null that the process is 
fourth order at the 5 percent level of confidence. 
For women, on the other hand, the tests reported in Table 7 suggest a first-order 
model  is  sufficient.  What  matters  for  women’s  current  employment  is  the  labour 
market status of the previous quarter, with no role played by preceding employment 
history.  This  suggests  that  older  women’s  trajectories  in  the  labour  market  are   22 
different relative to those of older men, which appear to be characterised by more 
dependence on the past. Such an impression is confirmed also by looking at the size 
of the cumulated state dependence effects: over the four quarters, the effect for men is 
almost  double  that  for  women;  88  percent  vs.  48  percent.  As  was  the  case  with 
unobserved heterogeneity, such a result is consistent with the findings from the MPH 
analysis  that  duration  dependence  was  larger  for  men  than  for  women.  From  the 
standpoint of economic interpretation, such evidence suggests that the factors that can 
trigger a virtuous circle of employability, such as human capital accumulation on the 
job or signalling effects, are less relevant for women, possibly due to the fact that in 
their  case  there  are  more  alternatives  to  labour  market  participation,  which  may 
weaken  the  positive  effects  of  continuous  employment.  In  turn,  this  implies  that 
policies  that  prevent  episodes  of  non-employment,  irrespective  to  some  extent  of 
individual  attributes,  may  have  a  more  lasting  impact  on  male  labour  market 
trajectories relative to female ones. On the other hand, the prevalence of heterogeneity 
for women as an explanatory factor for overall persistence, suggests that in their case 
policies  should  aim  to  endow  individuals  with  those  attributes  that  increase 
employability. 
Table 8 reports estimated coefficients for the transition equations of the model. 
For  both  men  and  women  there  are  few  factors  that  significantly  influence 
employment  transitions.  For  men,  there  are  evident  age  effects,  older  individuals 
experiencing  a  lower  likelihood  of  remaining  employed  over  quarters  relative  to 
younger  ones.  Also,  characteristics  like  the  presence  of  dependent  children,  the 
presence of a partner or the type of living arrangements attract significant estimates in 
the employment transition equation. On the other hand, qualifications do not seem to 
matter much. Similar remarks apply in the case of women, but here qualifications 
display more significant effects compared to men.   23 
The Appendix Tables report estimates of the initial condition equations. We can 
note that here personal attributes retain  more explanatory power than they do in the 
transition equation, reflecting the fact that these equations are unconditional on lagged 
labour market states. Also, these equations contain indicators of the GDP growth rate 
at the start of the spell, i.e. our “instrument” for initial conditions, which is generally 
significant in explaining the probability of the initial conditions. Formal tests of joint 
significant of the GDP growth indicators in the initial condition equations reject the 
null hypothesis at the  0.001% and 10% level of significance for men and women 
respectively. 
 
V. Summary and conclusions 
In this paper we have modelled employment transitions for men and women in 
the UK aged between 50 and the state pension age.  Using two related approaches, we 
have explored the existence of both duration dependence and state dependence, while 
addressing the econometrically important issue of endogenous initial conditions.   
The results provide a number of interesting insights.  From an econometric point 
of view, the importance of controlling for the endogeneity of initial conditions was 
evident.  Furthermore, the results showed the advantage of allowing for a fourth order 
Markov model in that the restriction implied by the common approach of working 
with a first order model was rejected when considering men’s transitions.  There were 
also some more substantive findings.  First, transitions were characterised by both 
duration dependence and state dependence.  Second, marked differences between men 
and  women  were  apparent.    For  women,  being  employed  in  the  previous  quarter 
affected the probability  of current employment while for men, employment in the 
previous  four  quarters  was  important.    This  translates  into  duration  dependence   24 
having  a  greater  influence  on  employment  probability  for  men  than  for  women.  
Conversely, unobserved heterogeneity was more important for women than for men.   
The combination of state dependence and duration dependence means that there 
is the potential for any individual experiencing a period of out of work to become 
trapped  in  non-employment.    This  may  be  for  a  number  of  reasons  such  as  skill 
deterioration, reduced morale or the establishment of a pattern of daily life that does 
not accommodate paid work.  The appropriate policy response is to help individuals 
avoid  experiencing  a  period  of  non-employment  and,  for  those  who  do  find 
themselves out of work, to intervene early to help them find new employment.  This 
policy response is particularly relevant for men, given the stronger effect of state and 
duration  dependence.    For  women,  the  greater  importance  of  unobserved 
heterogeneity suggests that the appropriate policy to encourage employment would be 
one which focuses on developing those attributes and skills linked to employability. 
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Appendix Table 1: Initial conditions equations, men 
  Employed t -1  Employed t -2  Employed t -3  Employed t -4 
Age category  (base: [50-53])                 
- (53-56]  -0.150  (5.11)  -0.141  (5.01)  -0.176  (6.21)  -0.201  (6.92) 
- (56-60]  -0.427  (13.10)  -0.403  (12.89)  -0.400  (13.02)  -0.447  (13.89) 
- (60-63]  -0.786  (22.13)  -0.757  (21.62)  -0.774  (22.50)  -0.793  (22.44) 
- (63-65]  -1.024  (23.84)  -0.982  (23.81)  -0.973  (22.66)  -0.861  (19.18) 
number of dependent children  0.095  (2.63)  0.089  (2.52)  0.088  (2.53)  0.111  (3.09) 
Has partner  0.283  (8.41)  0.265  (8.03)  0.288  (8.77)  0.283  (8.50) 
Housing tenure (base: owned outright)                 
- mortgaged  0.353  (12.16)  0.378  (13.44)  0.376  (13.63)  0.367  (13.40) 
- rented/ rent-free  -0.264  (6.97)  -0.251  (6.68)  -0.260  (7.11)  -0.249  (6.77) 
Highest qualification  (base: none)                 
- nvq5/6  0.062  (1.99)  0.090  (3.17)  0.023  (0.78)  0.069  (2.32) 
- nvq4  0.083  (2.13)  0.064  (1.80)  0.054  (1.50)  0.053  (1.33) 
- nvq3  0.089  (3.11)  0.112  (4.07)  0.097  (3.68)  0.097  (3.42) 
- nvq1/2  -0.010  (0.21)  0.032  (0.68)  0.074  (1.60)  0.068  (1.41) 
- other  -0.197  (4.80)  -0.186  (4.77)  -0.126  (3.26)  -0.125  (2.98) 
Region  (base: SE excl. London)                 
- North  -0.524  (8.94)  -0.548  (9.44)  -0.550  (9.74)  -0.524  (9.17) 
- Yorkshire & Humberside  -0.355  (7.33)  -0.341  (7.08)  -0.331  (6.89)  -0.306  (6.28) 
- East Midlands  -0.141  (2.63)  -0.111  (2.08)  -0.137  (2.54)  -0.133  (2.42) 
- East Anglia  -0.064  (0.92)  -0.065  (0.95)  -0.033  (0.49)  -0.069  (1.02) 
- London  -0.171  (3.24)  -0.152  (2.94)  -0.188  (3.64)  -0.204  (3.95) 
- South West  -0.088  (1.72)  -0.091  (1.82)  -0.112  (2.21)  -0.086  (1.72) 
- West Midlands  -0.100  (2.01)  -0.102  (2.06)  -0.146  (2.97)  -0.139  (2.79) 
- North West  -0.375  (7.92)  -0.379  (8.09)  -0.427  (9.12)  -0.392  (8.21) 
- Wales  -0.442  (7.35)  -0.448  (7.64)  -0.469  (7.54)  -0.427  (6.88) 
- Scotland  -0.313  (6.39)  -0.291  (6.11)  -0.308  (6.39)  -0.295  (6.05) 
- Northern Ireland  -0.364  (4.44)  -0.364  (4.55)  -0.350  (4.34)  -0.292  (3.55) 
Industry (base: manufacturing)                 
- primary  0.339  (4.67)  0.294  (4.12)  0.292  (3.88)  0.219  (2.78) 
- energy  -0.504  (5.51)  -0.381  (4.55)  -0.344  (3.88)  -0.348  (3.82) 
- construction  0.118  (2.87)  0.105  (2.53)  0.100  (2.35)  0.085  (1.89) 
- wholesale, retail & motor trade  0.249  (5.43)  0.230  (5.14)  0.233  (4.88)  0.291  (5.94) 
- hotels & restaurants  0.056  (0.69)  0.067  (0.89)  0.107  (1.30)  0.052  (0.62) 
- transport, storage & communication  0.019  (0.41)  -0.024  (0.51)  -0.002  (0.04)  0.055  (1.10) 
- financial intermediation  -0.284  (3.20)  -0.297  (3.73)  -0.344  (4.27)  -0.305  (3.72) 
- real estate, renting & business activities  0.339  (7.15)  0.311  (6.84)  0.328  (6.41)  0.412  (7.41) 
- public administration & defence  -0.052  (0.77)  -0.118  (1.93)  -0.137  (2.20)  -0.086  (1.36) 
- education  0.152  (2.43)  0.116  (1.90)  0.099  (1.53)  0.149  (2.01) 
- health & social work  0.269  (4.05)  0.252  (3.82)  0.331  (4.80)  0.341  (4.68) 
- other  -0.473  (8.22)  -0.484  (8.53)  -0.540  (9.63)  -0.596  (11.17) 
Occupation (base: manager/admin.)                 
- professional  0.212  (4.01)  0.196  (3.73)  0.164  (3.03)  0.131  (2.46) 
- associated, professional & technical  0.204  (3.88)  0.156  (3.21)  0.176  (3.50)  0.138  (2.61) 
- clerical, secretarial  0.165  (3.00)  0.174  (3.11)  0.192  (3.49)  0.153  (2.57) 
- craft and related  0.069  (1.63)  0.043  (1.04)  0.038  (0.91)  0.084  (2.03) 
- personal, protective  0.105  (1.63)  0.103  (1.65)  0.127  (2.06)  0.136  (2.12) 
- sales  0.197  (2.77)  0.120  (1.65)  0.163  (2.16)  0.176  (2.56) 
- plant and machine operatives  0.098  (2.21)  0.082  (1.87)  0.114  (2.59)  0.113  (2.52)   26 
- other  -0.174  (3.45)  -0.191  (4.03)  -0.166  (3.55)  -0.194  (4.15) 
Calendar year (base: 1993)                 
- 1994  -0.166  (3.19)  -0.164  (3.11)  -0.535  (6.41)  -0.599  (7.70) 
- 1995  -0.043  (0.73)  -0.030  (0.53)  -0.653  (7.54)  -0.555  (6.09) 
- 1996  -0.060  (0.90)  0.003  (0.05)  -0.649  (7.85)  -0.738  (8.48) 
- 1997  -0.017  (0.23)  0.062  (1.12)  -0.561  (7.86)  -0.709  (10.03) 
- 1998  -0.168  (2.57)  0.144  (2.46)  -0.468  (6.63)  -0.596  (8.76) 
- 1999  -0.028  (0.52)  -0.067  (1.25)  -0.483  (6.02)  -0.563  (7.24) 
- 2000  -0.018  (0.31)  -0.025  (0.45)  -0.617  (7.20)  -0.570  (5.99) 
- 2001  0.064  (0.92)  0.118  (1.92)  -0.517  (6.16)  -0.652  (7.58) 
- 2002  0.078  (1.05)  0.197  (3.49)  -0.453  (6.07)  -0.590  (8.01) 
-2003  -0.020  (0.31)  0.277  (4.97)  -0.424  (6.22)  -0.533  (7.98) 
Calendar quarter  (base: Oct-Dec)                 
- Q1: Jan-Mar  0.078  (1.14)  0.161  (2.85)  0.071  (1.02)  0.148  (1.98) 
- Q2: Apr-Jun  0.043  (0.69)  0.042  (0.72)  0.050  (0.82)  0.101  (1.61) 
- Q3: Jul-Sep  -0.046  (0.95)  0.040  (0.85)  0.029  (0.68)  0.053  (1.07) 
GDP growth at spell start  1.169  (2.60)  1.576  (3.91)  2.344  (5.70)  3.561  (8.88) 
Constant  0.579  (6.35)  0.453  (6.10)  1.057  (11.32)  1.097  (10.52) 
                 
Wald test of joint significance of GDP 
indicator in all initial conditions equations    d.o.f.=4    χ
2=80.17    p-value=  0.0000   
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Appendix Table2:  Initial conditions equations, women 
  Employed t -1  Employed t -2  Employed t -3  Employed t -4 
Age category  (base: [50-53])                 
- (53-56]  -0.114  (3.96)  -0.150  (5.31)  -0.135  (4.64)  -0.154  (5.23) 
- (56-60]  -0.338  (10.48)  -0.354  (11.10)  -0.309  (9.51)  -0.300  (9.18) 
number of dependent children  0.024  (0.51)  -0.023  (0.56)  -0.061  (1.54)  -0.022  (0.55) 
Has partner  0.017  (0.51)  0.052  (1.60)  0.029  (0.86)  0.047  (1.34) 
Housing tenure (base: owned outright)                 
- mortgaged  0.263  (8.77)  0.280  (9.61)  0.290  (10.25)  0.241  (8.33) 
- rented/ rent-free  -0.209  (4.77)  -0.155  (3.63)  -0.192  (4.31)  -0.232  (5.19) 
Highest qualification  (base: none)                 
- nvq5/6  0.127  (3.61)  0.088  (2.58)  0.109  (3.25)  0.102  (2.58) 
- nvq4  0.076  (2.20)  0.051  (1.63)  0.055  (1.68)  0.023  (0.69) 
- nvq3  0.052  (1.30)  0.038  (0.98)  0.047  (1.21)  0.040  (0.90) 
- nvq1/2  -0.008  (0.15)  -0.012  (0.23)  -0.006  (0.10)  -0.003  (0.06) 
- other  -0.372  (7.51)  -0.329  (6.92)  -0.273  (5.33)  -0.209  (2.90) 
Region  (base: SE excl. London)                 
- North  -0.343  (5.24)  -0.324  (5.07)  -0.246  (3.70)  -0.268  (4.08) 
- Yorkshire & Humberside  -0.160  (2.83)  -0.121  (2.11)  -0.154  (2.72)  -0.109  (1.92) 
- East Midlands  -0.159  (2.60)  -0.175  (2.86)  -0.188  (2.95)  -0.158  (2.48) 
- East Anglia  -0.146  (1.92)  -0.088  (1.17)  -0.041  (0.54)  -0.096  (1.25) 
- London  -0.148  (2.49)  -0.177  (3.08)  -0.158  (2.69)  -0.116  (1.98) 
- South West  -0.067  (1.13)  -0.070  (1.22)  -0.047  (0.81)  -0.051  (0.89) 
- West Midlands  -0.123  (2.22)  -0.098  (1.68)  -0.106  (1.87)  -0.099  (1.66) 
- North West  -0.258  (4.86)  -0.262  (5.02)  -0.196  (3.74)  -0.188  (3.57) 
- Wales  -0.358  (5.11)  -0.426  (6.12)  -0.396  (5.77)  -0.384  (5.65) 
- Scotland  -0.199  (3.61)  -0.209  (3.81)  -0.172  (3.11)  -0.134  (2.38) 
- Northern Ireland  -0.477  (5.11)  -0.387  (4.38)  -0.368  (4.10)  -0.362  (3.89) 
Industry (base: manufacturing)                 
- primary  0.596  (3.63)  0.333  (1.73)  0.610  (3.06)  0.474  (2.68) 
- energy  -0.675  (2.94)  -0.724  (3.14)  -0.727  (3.16)  -0.552  (2.58) 
- construction  0.315  (2.63)  0.316  (2.53)  0.389  (2.89)  0.362  (2.61) 
- wholesale, retail & motor trade  0.156  (2.27)  0.142  (2.03)  0.157  (2.18)  0.177  (2.54) 
- hotels & restaurants  0.157  (1.87)  0.094  (1.15)  0.277  (3.18)  0.349  (4.04) 
- transport, storage & communication  0.067  (0.73)  0.083  (0.93)  0.153  (1.60)  0.183  (1.92) 
- financial intermediation  0.037  (0.35)  0.079  (0.75)  0.132  (1.17)  0.185  (1.64) 
- real estate, renting & business 
activities  0.137  (1.82)  0.164  (2.16)  0.224  (2.66)  0.280  (3.39) 
- public administration & defence  0.096  (1.10)  0.135  (1.47)  0.210  (2.31)  0.275  (3.05) 
- education  0.222  (2.96)  0.168  (2.31)  0.204  (2.44)  0.307  (3.89) 
- health & social work  0.276  (3.81)  0.244  (3.44)  0.310  (4.16)  0.339  (4.60) 
- other  -0.597  (7.31)  -0.625  (7.51)  -0.602  (7.12)  -0.636  (7.84) 
Occupation (base: manager/admin.)                 
- professional  -0.025  (0.32)  0.011  (0.14)  -0.009  (0.10)  -0.101  (1.23) 
- associated, professional & technical  0.077  (0.96)  0.103  (1.25)  0.097  (1.19)  0.031  (0.40) 
- clerical, secretarial  0.069  (1.16)  0.135  (2.18)  0.097  (1.64)  0.011  (0.20) 
- craft and related  -0.367  (2.99)  -0.329  (2.48)  -0.234  (1.75)  -0.217  (1.69) 
- personal, protective  -0.087  (1.08)  0.001  (0.01)  -0.068  (0.87)  -0.135  (1.80) 
- sales  -0.100  (1.29)  -0.058  (0.74)  -0.067  (0.90)  -0.075  (1.00) 
- plant and machine operatives  -0.237  (2.34)  -0.140  (1.40)  -0.176  (1.75)  -0.178  (1.80) 
- other  -0.608  (8.68)  -0.539  (7.36)  -0.594  (8.63)  -0.665  (9.65) 
Calendar year (base: 1993)                   28 
- 1994  -0.219  (3.65)  -0.307  (4.78)  -0.483  (5.29)  -0.577  (6.53) 
- 1995  0.040  (0.60)  0.017  (0.26)  -0.632  (6.01)  -0.606  (5.60) 
- 1996  0.009  (0.11)  -0.044  (0.60)  -0.697  (7.26)  -0.685  (6.68) 
- 1997  0.057  (0.65)  0.031  (0.44)  -0.645  (7.56)  -0.725  (8.09) 
- 1998  -0.123  (1.66)  0.020  (0.27)  -0.634  (8.00)  -0.678  (8.69) 
- 1999  -0.109  (1.82)  -0.114  (1.81)  -0.457  (4.99)  -0.622  (7.15) 
- 2000  0.058  (0.85)  -0.001  (0.02)  -0.747  (7.37)  -0.513  (4.61) 
- 2001  0.183  (2.20)  0.115  (1.52)  -0.554  (5.70)  -0.684  (6.62) 
- 2002  0.157  (1.82)  0.130  (1.85)  -0.526  (6.16)  -0.612  (6.99) 
-2003  -0.031  (0.41)  0.116  (1.51)  -0.447  (5.64)  -0.450  (5.63) 
Calendar quarter  (base: Oct-Dec)                 
- Q1: Jan-Mar  0.223  (2.76)  0.134  (1.89)  0.115  (1.42)  0.143  (1.63) 
- Q2: Apr-Jun  0.165  (2.16)  -0.010  (0.15)  0.120  (1.66)  0.117  (1.57) 
- Q3: Jul-Sep  0.008  (0.13)  -0.047  (0.87)  0.069  (1.37)  0.062  (1.04) 
GDP growth at spell start  -0.402  (0.89)  0.001  (0.03)  -0.048  (0.12)  0.996  (2.07) 
Constant  0.588  (5.11)  0.617  (5.72)  1.162  (9.84)  1.227  (9.66) 
                 
Wald test of joint significance of GDP 
indicator in all initial conditions 
equations 
  d.o.f.=4    χ
2=7.85    p-value=  0.0973   
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Figure 1: Employment rates among men and women aged between 50 and the state 






























Source: Longitudinal Labour Force Survey, 1993-2003 
 
Figure 2: Estimated hazard rates of employment entry and exit over first 10 years (40 
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Table 1: Economic status when first observed by sex (col %) 
  Men  Women 
Employee  51.3  56.5 
Self-employed  15.6  5.6 
ILO unemployed  4.7  2.9 
Inactive, not seeking but would like work      
- looking after family/ home  0.3  1.2 
- long term sick or disabled  4.2  2.7 
- believes no job available  0.7  0.6 
- not looked  0.5  0.5 
Inactive, not seeking and would not like work     
- looking after family, home  0.9  10.1 
- long-term sick or disabled  10.7  9.4 
- not need or want job  1.0  2.9 
- retired  7.9  4.4 
- other reason  0.5  1.3 
Base  14,653  11,011 
Note: Column percentages do not sum to 100 since, for presentational purposes, categories accounting for less 
than 0.5 per cent have not been shown. 
 
Table 2: Length of time out of work for those not working but who have previously 
worked (col %) 
  Men  Women 
less than 3 months  2.4  1.5 
3 months but less than 6 months  3.5  3.1 
6 months but less than 12 months  6.4  5.4 
1 year but less than 2 years  12.2  7.7 
2 years but less than 3 years  10.1  6.9 
3 years but less than 4 years  9.2  7.0 
4 years but less than 5 years  7.3  5.7 
5 years or more  49.0  62.8 
Base  4,634  3,993 
 
 
Table 3: Transitions between employment and non-employment (row %) 
  When last interviewed (one year later): 
When first interviewed:  Employed  Non-employed  Base 
Men       
- Employed  91.1  8.9  10,019 
- Non-employed  6.6  93.4  4,634 
Women       
- Employed  90.2  9.9  7,018 
- Non-employed  6.3  93.7  3,993 
   33 
Table 4: Mean characteristics by sex and employment status when first observed (Col 
%) 
  Men  Women 
  Non-employed  Employed  Non-employed  Employed 
Duration of spell, quarters  
(base: >20)         
- 1-2  5.8  5.2  4.5  4.3 
- 3-4  6.3  3.6  5.4  3.8 
- 5-8  12.2  6.0  7.7  5.8 
- 9-12  10.1  5.3  6.9  5.3 
- 13-20  16.5  8.5  12.7  10.2 
Age category  (base: [50-53])         
- (53-56]  17.2  23.5  31.4  29.7 
- (56-60]  27.0  23.2  34.5  21.5 
- (60-63]  28.2  12.4  0.0  0.0 
- (63-65]  11.4  2.9  0.0  0.0 
Highest qualification  (base: 
none)*          
- nvq5/6  12.4  13.0  9.6  11.7 
- nvq4  8.1  10.5  18.6  24.8 
- nvq3  27.5  32.9  8.0  10.3 
- nvq1/2  5.7  7.9  8.0  12.6 
- other  9.2  14.6  4.3  8.8 
Housing tenure (base: owned 
outright)         
- mortgaged  22.5  51.8  27.7  50.4 
- rented/ rent-free  35.7  15.7  32.5  14.7 
no. of dependent children (base: 
none)  8.3  16.7  10.3  10.5 
Partner (base: no partner)  73.6  86.5  73.6  79.4 
Occupation (base: 
manager/admin.)         
- professional  7.1  12.3  4.0  9.6 
- associated, professional & 
technical  5.3  8.5  3.5  10.1 
- clerical, secretarial  4.2  5.7  11.1  25.3 
- craft and related  14.5  19.8  1.8  2.5 
- personal, protective  3.3  4.1  7.9  13.7 
- sales  2.0  3.3  6.3  10.0 
- plant & machine operatives  12.9  16.0  3.1  4.2 
- other  36.8  8.4  57.9  13.4 
Industry (base: manufacturing)         
- primary  2.3  3.2  0.6  1.1 
- energy  1.9  0.9  0.3  0.2 
- construction  7.9  11.0  0.7  1.4 
- wholesale, retail & motor 
trade  5.6  11.1  8.6  15.1 
- hotels & restaurants  1.6  1.5  2.7  3.8 
- transport, storage &  6.6  8.9  1.2  2.6   34 
communication 
- financial intermediation  2.6  2.1  1.3  2.9 
- real estate, renting & business 
act.   3.5  10.4  3.2  8.3 
- public administration & 
defence  4.5  5.3  2.5  6.0 
- education  3.3  5.7  6.4  14.3 
- health & social work  1.9  3.9  9.0  20.5 
- other  40.4  14.2  57.4  14.5 
Region  (base: SE excl. 
London)         
- North  7.2  4.3  6.2  4.7 
- Yorkshire & Humberside  9.6  8.4  8.7  8.5 
- East Midlands  6.8  7.7  7.4  7.1 
- East Anglia  2.9  4.2  3.7  4.0 
- London  11.7  10.3  11.3  10.8 
- South West  6.9  9.0  6.9  8.6 
- West Midlands  8.8  9.8  9.2  9.4 
- North West  12.9  9.5  11.3  10.0 
- Wales  6.5  4.3  6.4  4.2 
- Scotland  9.9  8.1  9.5  8.3 
- Northern Ireland  2.4  1.9  2.7  1.6 
Calendar quarter  (base: Oct-
Dec)         
- Q1: Jan-Mar  22.9  23.1  23.5  23.5 
- Q2: Apr-Jun  26.2  27.4  25.9  27.2 
- Q3: Jul-Sep  28.2  28.2  28.3  28.2 
Calendar year (base: 1993)         
- 1994  10.9  9.9  10.6  9.6 
- 1995  4.5  3.6  4.3  3.3 
- 1996  6.7  6.8  6.9  6.5 
- 1997  11.3  10.7  11.4  10.5 
- 1998  10.6  11.6  11.4  11.3 
- 1999  11.7  11.8  11.7  11.6 
- 2000  4.3  4.0  4.0  4.3 
- 2001  7.3  8.0  7.6  8.1 
- 2002  11.6  12.1  11.6  13.0 
- 2003  11.1  12.4  10.3  13.3 
No. of observations (persons)  4,634  10,019  3,993  7,018 
* All qualifications are converted to approximate National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) equivalents.  The 
rough academic equivalents are: NVQ1 - low-level qualification, age 16; NVQ2 – qualification, age 16; 
NVQ3 – qualification, age 18 ; NVQ4 – degree; NVQ5/6 – higher degree.   35 
Table 5: MPH estimates of time to enter or exit employment, by sex. 
  Men    Women 
  Employment 
entry 




Duration of spell, quarters    coeff.    (t-stat)  coeff.   (t-stat)  coeff.   (t-stat)  coeff.   (t-stat) 
(base: >20)                 
- 1-2  3.55    (16.30)  1.65    (10.05)  3.33    (10.46)  1.05   (4.18) 
- 3-4  2.67    (12.24)  1.33    (8.46)  2.92    (9.83)  1.10   (4.98) 
- 5-8  2.06    (9.93)  0.64    (4.42)  1.93    (6.54)  0.88   (4.64) 
- 9-12  1.12    (4.77)  0.43    (2.78)  1.68    (5.70)  0.41   (2.06) 
- 13-20  0.56    (2.42)  -0.04   (0.30)  0.80    (2.91)  0.24   (1.42) 
Age category                   
(base: [50-53])                 
- (53-56]  -0.34   (2.19)  0.003   (0.02)  -0.54   (2.88)  0.25   (2.05) 
- (56-60]  -0.67   (4.23)  0.48    (4.42)  -0.89   (4.55)  0.97   (7.25) 
- (60-63]  -1.35   (7.24)  1.02    (7.88)         
- (63-65]  -2.23   (7.02)  2.51    (15.38)         
Highest qualification                   
(base: none)                 
- nvq5/6  0.21    (1.03)  -0.06   (0.44)  0.06    (0.23)  -0.25  (1.46) 
- nvq4  0.41    (1.87)  -0.19   (1.22)  0.48    (2.24)  -0.17  (1.11) 
- nvq3  0.44    (2.60)  -0.05   (0.43)  0.47    (1.69)  0.06   (0.31) 
- nvq1/2  0.36   (1.44)  -0.01   (0.06)  -0.35   (1.03)  0.16   (0.77) 
- other  0.42    (1.79)  -0.17   (1.00)  0.12    (0.38)  -0.01  (0.05) 
Housing tenure                  
(base: owned outright)                 
- mortgaged  0.49    (3.68)  -0.37   (4.14)  0.50    (2.75)  -0.49  (4.20) 
- rented/ rent-free  -0.05   (0.33)  -0.16   (1.34)  -0.12   (0.57)  -0.21  (1.22) 
no. of dep. children (base: none)   0.10    (0.55)  -0.03   (0.23)  0.53    (2.13)  -0.03  (0.16) 
Partner (base: no partner)  -0.10   (0.66)  -0.36   (3.16)  0.22    (1.12)  0.06   (0.42) 
Occupation                  
(base: manager/admin.)                 
- professional  0.06    (0.25)  0.04    (0.22)  1.44    (2.74)  0.35   (1.21) 
- associated, professional & tech.  0.06    (0.28)  -0.12   (0.74)  0.75    (1.49)  -0.22  (0.84) 
- clerical, secretarial  -0.13   (0.47)  0.16    (0.93)  0.33    (0.86)  -0.01  (0.02) 
- craft and related  -0.22   (1.06)  0.02    (0.13)  -0.002   (0.00)  1.02   (2.78) 
- personal, protective  -0.24   (0.74)  -0.10    (0.45)  0.24    (0.53)  0.20   (0.82) 
- sales  0.26   (0.77)  -0.13    (0.54)  -0.52   (1.12)  0.46   (1.79) 
- plant & machine operatives  -0.35  (1.53)  -0.01    (0.06)  0.05    (0.10)  0.26   (0.80) 
- other  -0.25  (1.04)  0.18    (1.13)  0.12    (0.30)  0.20   (0.86) 
Industry (base: manufacturing)                 
- primary  0.48   (1.44)  -1.09    (3.98)  -0.47   (0.45)  -1.34  (2.05) 
- energy  -1.70  (2.12)  0.65     (1.95)  0.04     (0.04)  3.04   (2.16) 
- construction  0.24   (1.12)  -0.19   (1.34)  -0.85    (0.94)  -0.09   (0.18) 
- wholesale, retail & motor trade  -0.35  (1.34)  -0.10   (0.68)  -0.003   (0.01)  -0.45  (1.75) 
- hotels & restaurants  0.37   (1.05)  0.34    (1.18)  -0.25    (0.48)  0.68   (2.14) 
- transport, storage & 
communication 
-0.22  (0.89)  -0.11   (0.72)  -0.49    (0.70)  -0.03  (0.07) 
- financial intermediation  -0.06  (0.21)  0.39    (1.41)  -0.59    (0.86)  0.02   (0.05) 
- real estate, renting & business act.   0.38   (1.51)  -0.15   (0.99)  -0.29    (0.63)  0.09   (0.32) 
- public administration & defence  -0.07  (0.28)  0.13    (0.72)  -0.32    (0.60)  -0.31  (1.03) 
- education  -0.03  (0.11)  0.04    (0.19)  -0.48    (1.05)  0.02   (0.07) 
- health & social work  0.29   (0.80)  -0.09   (0.41)  -0.30    (0.71)  -0.21  (0.84) 
- other  0.01   (0.03)  0.05    (0.30)  -0.08    (0.21)  0.25   (0.96)   36 
Region  (base: SE excl. London)                 
- North  -0.25  (0.96)  0.63    (3.28)  -0.68    (1.70)  0.66   (2.56) 
- Yorkshire & Humberside  -0.25  (1.05)  0.38    (2.49)  0.07     (0.23)  0.13   (0.60) 
- East Midlands  0.11   (0.45)  0.07    (0.44)  -0.35    (1.07)  0.06   (0.23) 
- East Anglia  -0.13  (0.39)  0.04    (0.19)  -0.53    (1.25)  -0.25  (0.86) 
- London  0.17   (0.86)  0.01    (0.08)  -0.44    (1.48)  0.57   (2.90) 
- South West  -0.03  (0.12)  0.08    (0.51)  0.41     (1.35)  0.28   (1.32) 
- West Midlands  -0.12  (0.54)  -0.20   (1.28)  -0.14    (0.48)  0.03   (0.14) 
- North West  -0.56  (2.53)  0.124   (0.82)  -0.767    (2.49)  0.236  (1.15) 
- Wales  -0.50  (1.60)  0.27    (1.32)  -1.02    (2.44)  0.28   (0.90) 
- Scotland  -0.12  (0.52)  0.34    (2.17)  -0.51    (1.62)  0.41   (1.88) 
- Northern Ireland  -1.01  (2.05)  0.23    (0.79)  -2.13    (2.34)  0.04   (0.09) 
Calendar quarter  (base: Oct-Dec)                 
- Q1: Jan-Mar  0.26   (1.70)  0.01    (0.16)  0.24     (1.41)  0.17   (1.58) 
- Q2: Apr-Jun  0.22   (1.43)  -0.15   (1.72)  -0.29    (1.50)  0.05   (0.48) 
- Q3: Jul-Sep  0.30   (1.95)  -0.12   (1.37)  0.26    (1.54)  0.16   (1.55) 
Calendar year (base: 1993)                 
- 1994  0.25   (0.88)  -0.10   (0.62)  0.44    (1.38)  0.002  (0.01) 
- 1995  0.02   (0.06)  -0.01   (0.03)  -0.15   (0.39)  0.11   (0.48) 
- 1996  0.55   (1.93)  0.23    (1.39)  0.39    (1.12)  0.73   (3.18) 
- 1997  0.36   (1.30)  -0.22   (1.29)  0.76    (2.37)  -0.08  (0.36) 
- 1998  0.42   (1.50)  -0.25   (1.49)  0.10    (0.28)  -0.14  (0.62) 
- 1999  0.33   (1.14)  -0.08   (0.50)  0.29    (0.86)  0.35   (1.68) 
- 2000  0.48   (1.71)  -0.34   (1.92)  0.59    (1.75)  0.06   (0.25) 
- 2001  0.53   (1.85)  0.06    (0.34)  0.25    (0.71)  0.01   (0.04) 
- 2002  0.29   (1.02)  -0.33   (2.00)  -0.18   (0.50)  -0.28  (1.30) 
- 2003  0.62   (2.32)  -0.32   (2.15)  -0.00   (0.00)  -0.03  (0.16) 
Constant  -4.97  (11.09)  -3.39   (13.31)  -4.77   (7.54)  -3.82  (10.13) 
σ
2  0.68 (1.51)  3.91 (5.85)  4.48 (3.60)  7.65 (8.03) 
LR test statistic of σ
2=0  (~ χ
2
(1) )  2.9  59.1  27.0  105.6 
Log-likelihood  -1591.71  -5092.15  -1376.08  -3807.19 
Observations  4634  10019  3993  7018 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses    37 
Table 6: Correlation structure of unobservables of the fourth order Markov model 
and tests for exogeneity of initial conditions 
  Men    Women 
  coeff.  t-stat    coeff.  t-stat 
ρ1  0.271  (2.32)    0.808  (6.50) 
ρ2  0.314  (2.88)    0.801  (6.57) 
ρ3  0.335  (3.22)    0.773  (6.06) 
ρ4  0.308  (2.87)    0.733  (5.38) 
σ32  0.981  (586.68)    0.979  (394.32) 
σ 42  0.956  (329.01)    0.954  (214.59) 
σ 52  0.933  (240.15)    0.922  (154.16) 
σ 43  0.980  (197.05)    0.976  (320.25) 
σ 53  0.954  (213.78)    0.945  (201.77) 
σ 54  0.977  (496.33)    0.971  (285.87) 
  χ
2
(4)  p-value    χ
2
(4)  p-value 
Wald test of exogenous initial conditions  
(H0: ρ1=ρ2=ρ3=ρ3) 




Table 7: Estimated measures of state dependence, cumulated state dependence, and 
Wald tests for the order of the Markov model  
  Men    Women 
  coeff.  t-stat    coeff.  t-stat 
SD1  0.755  (13.68)    0.404  (2.32) 
SD2  0.060  (1.71)    0.015  (0.28) 
SD3  0.012  (0.53)    0.055  (1.09) 
SD4  0.057  (1.77)    0.051  (0.87) 
CSD2  0.828  (18.41)    0.414  (2.18) 
CSD3  0.842  (20.89)    0.450  (2.17) 
CSD4  0.882  (21.75)    0.480  (2.15) 
  χ
2(df)  p-value    χ
2(df)  p-value 
Third order 
H0: λ4= 0 
4.23 (1)  (0.0396)    0.70 (1)  (0.4034) 
Second order  
H0: λ4= λ3=0 
5.38 (2)  (0.0679)    1.59 (2)  (0.4516) 
First order  
H0: λ4= λ3= λ2=0 
12.91 (3)  (0.0048)    1.59 (3)  (0.6605) 
Static 
H0: λ4= λ3= λ2= λ1=0 
109.01 (4)  (0.0000)    8.61 (4)  (0.0716) 
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Table  8:  Estimates  of  the  employment  transition  equation  from  the  fourth  order 
Markov model 
  Men  Women 
  coeff.  t-stat  coeff.  t-stat 
Employed t-1  2.399  (9.04)  1.104  (2.37) 
Employed t-2  0.343  (2.23)  0.038  (0.28) 
Employed t-3  0.083  (0.57)  0.141  (1.04) 
Employed t-4  0.326  (2.06)  0.131  (0.84) 
Age category  (base: [50-53])         
- (53-56]  -0.204  (2.79)  -0.141  (2.92) 
- (56-60]  -0.332  (4.49)  -0.415  (7.92) 
- (60-63]  -0.568  (5.92)     
- (63-65]  -0.967  (8.80)     
number of dependent children  0.126  (1.60)  0.174  (2.05) 
Has partner  0.109  (1.65)  0.050  (1.01) 
Housing tenure (base: owned 
outright)         
- mortgaged  0.216  (3.85)  0.218  (4.59) 
- rented/ rent-free  -0.164  (2.50)  -0.184  (2.83) 
Highest qualification  (base: none)         
- nvq5/6  0.072  (0.93)  0.210  (2.84) 
- nvq4  0.098  (1.08)  0.107  (1.89) 
- nvq3  0.098  (1.57)  0.086  (1.29) 
- nvq1/2  0.075  (0.72)  -0.049  (0.55) 
- other  -0.179  (1.88)  -0.522  (5.36) 
Region  (base: SE excl. London)         
- North  -0.415  (3.82)  -0.274  (2.78) 
- Yorkshire & Humberside  -0.217  (2.37)  -0.040  (0.46) 
- East Midlands  -0.059  (0.58)  -0.173  (1.96) 
- East Anglia  0.047  (0.41)  -0.104  (0.99) 
- London  -0.100  (1.04)  -0.161  (1.97) 
- South West  -0.112  (1.27)  0.046  (0.51) 
- West Midlands  -0.022  (0.24)  -0.063  (0.81) 
- North West  -0.284  (3.12)  -0.218  (2.72) 
- Wales  -0.449  (4.31)  -0.335  (3.13) 
- Scotland  -0.169  (1.85)  -0.168  (2.07) 
- Northern Ireland  -0.418  (2.54)  -0.430  (3.53) 
Industry (base: manufacturing)         
- primary  0.372  (2.97)  0.912  (4.55) 
- energy  -0.305  (1.80)  -0.808  (2.68) 
- construction  0.111  (1.46)  0.547  (2.38) 
- wholesale, retail & motor trade  0.220  (2.53)  0.233  (2.04) 
- hotels & restaurants  0.112  (0.65)  0.113  (0.86) 
- transport, storage & communication  0.133  (1.61)  0.087  (0.60) 
- financial intermediation  -0.238  (1.63)  0.102  (0.58) 
- real estate, renting & business 
activities  0.481  (4.62)  0.177  (1.61) 
- public administration & defence  -0.048  (0.45)  0.197  (1.51) 
- education  0.199  (1.66)  0.188  (1.64)   39 
- health & social work  0.209  (1.70)  0.274  (2.54) 
- other  -0.091  (0.89)  -0.570  (4.95) 
Occupation (base: manager/admin.)         
- professional  -0.030  (0.30)  0.190  (1.48) 
- associated, professional & technical  -0.032  (0.32)  0.175  (1.52) 
- clerical, secretarial  -0.025  (0.22)  0.029  (0.34) 
- craft and related  -0.057  (0.77)  -0.122  (0.74) 
- personal, protective  0.353  (2.36)  -0.030  (0.29) 
- sales  0.258  (1.65)  -0.195  (1.68) 
- plant and machine operatives  -0.061  (0.71)  -0.265  (1.83) 
- other  -0.289  (3.51)  -0.455  (4.48) 
Calendar year (base: 1993)         
- 1994  -0.084  (0.84)  -0.191  (1.97) 
- 1995  0.029  (0.25)  -0.079  (0.72) 
- 1996  0.169  (1.10)  0.110  (0.79) 
- 1997  -0.018  (0.11)  -0.254  (1.89) 
- 1998  0.045  (0.40)  -0.257  (2.50) 
- 1999  0.083  (0.83)  -0.053  (0.58) 
- 2000  0.209  (1.70)  -0.045  (0.42) 
- 2001  0.033  (0.21)  0.108  (0.76) 
- 2002  0.115  (0.77)  -0.180  (1.34) 
-2003  0.088  (0.77)  -0.171  (1.65) 
Calendar quarter  (base: Oct-Dec)         
- Q1: Jan-Mar  0.114  (0.72)  0.217  (1.58) 
- Q2: Apr-Jun  0.163  (1.30)  0.172  (1.47) 
- Q3: Jul-Sep  0.136  (1.42)  0.012  (0.13) 
Constant  -1.453  (5.28)  -0.266  (0.60) 
Log likelihood  -15234.7    -11419.7   
Model chi2 (p-value)  1614.59  (0.00)  949.370  (0.00) 
Number of observations  14653    11011   
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